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A B S T R A C T
This paper suggests adopting a ‘post-normal science’ (PNS) style and practice in scientiﬁc
advice, and motivate the urgency of this methodological stance with the increasing
complexity, and polarisation affecting the use of science-based evidence for policy. We
reﬂect on challenges and opportunities faced by a ‘boundary organisation’ that interfaces
between science and policy, taking as example the European Commission’s Directorate
General Joint Research Centre, whose mission is stated as that to be the “in-house science
service”. We suggest that such an institution can be exemplary as to what could be changed
to improve the quality of evidence feeding into the policy processes in the European Union.
This paper suggests how an in-house culture of reﬂexivity and humility could trigger
changes in the existing styles and methods of scientiﬁc governance; at the JRC, taken as
example, this would mean opening up to the existing plurality of norms and styles of
scientiﬁc inquiry, and adopting more participatory approaches of knowledge production,
assessment and governance. We submit that the institutional changes advocated here are
desirable and urgent in order to confront the ongoing erosion of trust in ‘evidence based
policy’, anticipating controversies before they become evident in the institutional setting in
which institutions operate.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
“The requirement for the ‘sound science’ that is frequently invoked as necessary for rational policy decisions may
affectively conceal value-loadings that determine research conclusions and policy recommendations. In these new
circumstances, invoking ‘truth’ as the goal of science is a distraction, or even a diversion from real tasks. A more relevant
and robust guiding principle is quality, understood as a contextual property of scientiﬁc information. ( . . . ) In those
circumstances, the quality assurance of scientiﬁc inputs to the policy process requires an ‘extended peer community’,
consisting of all those with a stake in the dialogue on the issue.” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990).
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which meet “three criteria: ﬁrst, they provide the opportunity and sometimes the incentives for the creation and use of boundary
objects2 and standardised packages; second, they involve the participation of actors from both sides of the boundary, as well as
professionals who serve a mediating role; third, they exist at the frontier of the two relatively different social worlds of politics and
science, but they have distinct lines of accountability to each” (Guston, 2001). We take as example, the European Commission’s
Directorate General Joint Research Centre (JRC), which as we shall argue neatly ﬁts these criteria, with its role as mediator of
scientiﬁc input to policy, i.e. supplying at request of the other European Commission (EC) services the scientiﬁc knowledge
that may support the policy making cycle. The JRC appears as an example of a “boundary institution” and it is as such
endowed with a unique role within the EC itself. In order to respond to present societal challenges the JRC would need to
make choices and adopt styles of analysis, which are congruent with this role.
The JRC is not an institution that promotes policies as the OECD does; it is not a research and educational institution like a
University or an institution that conducts research “to beneﬁt private and public enterprise” as e.g. the Fraunhofer Institutes
are. The JRC is a Directorate-General of the European Commission that operates at a crossroad of intertwined political,
societal and business spheres. Historically, it developed ﬁrst as a “joint nuclear centre”, following the signature in 1957 of the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) treaty by the six founder European countries.
As discussed in detail elsewhere (Guimarães Pereira & Saltelli, 2014) the JRC has been developing since the early 1970s to
embrace more and more ﬁelds of research following the societal challenges of the time, putting the acquired expertise at the
service of external actors. For the sake of the argument that we try to develop here it is interesting to look at 2 mission
statements of the JRC a decade apart (see Box 1). Whilst the overall mission remains unchanged, and independence is
maintained as a core value, one can see some interesting changes. For example, the “customer-driven” approach of the early
2000s is substituted by a unique customer: the policy directorates general (DGs) of the EC. Today the JRC collaborates with
member states (MS) but the focus of the 2013 mission statement focused on the cooperation with policy services of the EC.
The JRC has been addressing pressing societal and policy issues while adopting the narratives of the time, which included
authority, control, prediction, independency, objectivity and neutrality of science and science-advice to policy. The changes
in the JRC mission reﬂect the gradual self-attributed role of independent advice, as well as its quest for consensus via its work
on standardisation, reference methods, tools and laboratories.
Several models have been proposed for the relation between science and decision-making in policy processes. Funtowicz
(2006) offered an evolutionary perspective of the governance of science in policy making through several stages and styles.
His account starts from the assumption of scientiﬁc perfection and human perfectibility (the Modern model) to progressively
incorporate elements of doubt and reﬂexivity such as, precaution (Precautionary model), stakeholder perspectives even in the
choice of the “problem” (Framing model), demarcation as science can be abused when used as evidence in the policy process
(demarcation model) – see Chapron (2014) and Goldacre (2012) – and extension to what counts as relevant knowledge by
involving an “extended peer community” (Extended participation model) – see Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990).
The history and the mission statements of the JRC suggest that the institution has remained ﬁrmly attached to the vision
of the modern model, i.e. “the experts’ (desire for) truth speaking to the politicians’ (need for) power” (Wildawsky, 1979). The
JRC hardly engages with the public in policy formulation, neither through its mission nor through its operation. At the EC,
institutionalised forms of public engagement are implemented by policy DGs through mechanisms such as the portal ‘Your
Voice’, and the inclusion of civil society organisations in committees and task forces, which are part of the EC’s impact
assessment practices. Although these activities have value for the policy cycle, they remain conﬁned in their actual function
of consultation reaching out very small numbers of European citizens. Recently, the “European initiative” provides a further
mechanism of citizenry involvement in European policy (http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/); projects such as
“Voices” (http://www.voicesforinnovation.eu) have been showcasing the value of other types of participatory practices. The
recently proposed package for ‘Better Regulation Package’ (SWD(2015) 110 ﬁnal) is still in progress, leaving space to inquire
about changes in the engagement of wider sectors of society, in particular the citizens of the EU, in policy affairs of the EC.
Box 1. Changing mission of the JRC over the last decade (authors’ emphasis).
2002:The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientiﬁc and technical support for the conception,
development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a service of the European Commission, the JRC
functions as a reference centre of science and technology for the Union. Close to the policy making process, it serves
the common interest of Member States, while being independent of social interests whether private or national.
2013: As the Commission's in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre's mission is to provide EU policies
with independent, evidence-based scientiﬁc and technical support throughout the whole policy cycle. Working in
close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal challenges while stimulating
innovation through developing new methods, tools and standards, and sharing its know-how with the Member
States, the scientiﬁc community and international partners.
2 I.e. information or knowledge that is used in different ways by different communities and networks. This concept was introduced by Star and Griesemer
(1989).
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science advice (Guimarães Pereira & Saltelli, 2014; Benessia et al., 2016). The brief also suggested to foster the ﬁelds of science
and technology studies (STS) as an engine of internal reﬂexivity, and post-normal science (PNS) as elements of that identity.
In fact, a recent review of the JRC operation (Cunningham et al., 2015) recommended that the JRC acts to improve
interdisciplinary research and involves social scientists in every thematic area.
In this paper, we move from the technical paper to argue that there is momentum for the JRC (or institutions alike) to seek
for a new identity, starting from critically and reﬂectively examining the original meanings of its assigned mandates of
authority, neutrality and independence. We will ﬁrst offer a brief overview of the recent changes, on-going tensions, and
public debates on science practices, science governance and scientiﬁc advice to policy making. We next suggest how to move
beyond the status quo, with a view to transform the present crisis of science and science advice into an opportunity for the
organisation. In particular, we suggest that changes based on a greater role for societal inquiry such as the post-normal
science framework, is appropriate for cases where “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent”
(Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992; 251–273).
In our view, PNS-inspired ideas of quality assurance of science informing policy making could make justice of JRC’s
uniqueness within the EC and within the EU.
2. Current challenges for policy relevant science
It has been argued that a deﬁning element of modernity is the relation between science and power, with the former
offering legitimacy to the latter. This privileged place of science stems from an eighteenth-century dream of science as a
rational solution to practical and social problems and has been intertwined within political discourse for a long time (see e.g
Vannevar Bush’s “Science The Endless Frontier” in 1945). The dream and its consequences have been the subject of
considerable debate and critique in the twentieth century, after thinkers such as Husserl, Kuhn, Toulmin, Lyotard,
Feyerabend, Lakatos and many others questioned the (requested) role of science to generate truth and resolve political
disputes.
In order to put the role of a boundary institution such as the JRC in perspective a short overview of a huge amount of
scholarship on the conﬂicting role of science with policy is necessary; however, we cannot condense here a century of
epistemological disputes, so we will focus on current challenges that affect science and scientiﬁc advice to public policy from
the contained perspective of a boundary institution.
2.1. Elements of an announced crisis
Ravetz (2016) has recently noted that there is no shortage of proposed remedies to many of the deﬁning elements of what
appears as a ‘crisis’ of legitimacy in the scientiﬁc endeavour: reproducibility, abuse of metrics and peer review. The
announcement of a ‘crisis’ of legitimacy is not new (see Ravetz, 1971; Lyotard, 1979). More recently, many authors have
described this state of affairs as a crisis of creativity (Le Fanu, 2010; Strumsky, Lobo, & Tainter, 2010) and of quality (Ioannidis,
2005; Mirowski, 2011). The JRC has contributed to this reﬂection with a recently published book on the root causes of
science’s crisis (Benessia et al., 2016; Saltelli this issue and Giampietro, this issue).
The scientiﬁc community has long portrayed its endeavour as self-regulating, bound to a higher ethical commitment to
truth-telling than society as a whole. Yet the tone and intractability of present controversies suggest that society may be less
willing to accept such claims than in the past. We have noted an increasing number of critical pieces on key academic
journals (see e.g. editorials of Lancet, 2015; Nature, 2015), full projects on research integrity3 and literate media (such as The
Economist, The Guardian, and many others) that address this issue and its multiple manifestations.
The issue of reproducibility in particular, has been subject of a myriad of recent publications and projects (Ioannidis,
2005; Ioannidis, 2014; The Economist, 2013; The Economist, 2014; Horton, 2015; Baker, 2016; Goodman, Fanelli, & Ioannidis,
2016); concerns about reproducibility have permeated many ﬁelds of science (Begley & Ellis 2012; Begley 2013; Begley &
Ioannidis, 2015); published results of laboratory experiments cannot be trusted without veriﬁcation (Sanderson 2013);
Begley (2013) talks of “suspected work [ . . . in] the majority of preclinical cancer papers in top tier journals”. Peer review has
equally been under scrutiny for a long time; in 2015 the publisher Springer and the Université Joseph Fourier released
SciDetect, a software to discover false scientiﬁc papers generated by algorithms (Springer, 2015). Scientists are also often
chased by predatory publishers who charge authors for publishing without providing any control or peer review; the shift to
digital publications, which has not been accompanied with collectively agreed new ways of quality assurance is playing an
important part. Ravetz (2016) noted how the substitution of a ‘Gemeinschaft’ by a ‘Gesellschaft’ has brought about dramatic
changes in the old system of rewards and sanctions. The abuse of metrics to describe performance as well as the vagaries of
the publications business (Ioannidis, 2014 Wilsdon, 2014; Callaway, 2016; Miedema, 2016; etc.)  which rely on arguable
metrics to qualify journals, researchers and their writings, put inadequate and even corrupting pressures on researchers to
publish at all cost; the rise of retractions of scientiﬁc papers is seen with increasing concern (Van Noorden, 2011 and the site:3 See http://www.wcri2015.org/
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norms associated to the scientiﬁc endeavour are under concerned scrutiny (Jasanoff, 2013).
The key message in Ravetz (1971) is that science is a social endeavour. Thus as the societal and political change and
science moves from little to big or mega science the received notions of quality assurance become inadequate. In turn quality
assurance norms and practices reﬂect and determine the knowledge production systems.
According to historian Philip Mirowski (Mirowski 1991; Mirowski 2013), one of the consequences of having adopted
neoliberal policies and a neoclassic stance in economics since the eighties has been a massive privatisation of research. For
this author this has led to a corruption of the self-governance method of science, and would be now jeopardising the very
mechanism of science driven innovation (1991; 2013). In his 2011 book ‘Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science’ he
argues inter alia that commoditised science loses quality. Since the 1980s research has moved away from government
laboratories and large research laboratories of major corporations and universities into contract research organisation (CRO)
acting under budget pressure and short time horizons. In his recent piece in the newspaper The Guardian, Ravetz (2016)
includes this change in paymasters – when market replaces ‘Gemeinschaft’ – among the root causes for quality decline,
aggravating the existing epistemological and legitimacy challenges.
Another relevant issue that interests this discussion is ethics. The discussion of ethics in science and technology realms
has largely been in the hands of professional communities. Yet the failures of the scientiﬁc community’s ethos in respecting
individuals in research during World War I (deﬁned as “the chemists’ war” for the use of poisonous gas – Ravetz, 1971, p. 38),
the role of statistical science in upholding eugenics (Hacking, 1990), the use of humans in experiments in World War II (US
Holocaust Memorial, 2015), as well as the systematic enrolment (and justiﬁcation) of science (best described as techno-
science) into the production of ever new environmental challenges, has been giving ethics an increasing pro-active role in
addressing values challenges arising from techno-science developments.
Uncertainty is at the core of the discussions of quality in science; its ampliﬁcation or minimisation are standard practices
operated by different actors to either support (minimising uncertainties) or deter (maximising them) the adoption of a policy
(Saltelli, Guimarães Pereira, Van der Sluijs, & Funtowicz, 2013). Famous cases of uncertainty fabrication are tobacco
companies ﬁghting to deny the health effect of smoking (Oreskes & Conway, 2010), and the battles between industry and
regulators over the USA’s data quality act, where industry fought hard to amplify uncertainty in order to prevent regulators
from imposing more stringent standards (Michaels, 2005). As discussed earlier, scientists may themselves encumber the
public debate with an extra doses of conﬂict and animosity, making controversies less amenable to a solution (Sarewitz,
2004).
These types of problems are crucially important to both the epistemological and social practices of science. They are also
equally relevant to quality assurance of scientiﬁc knowledge used for policy, especially when science is mandated by policy
circles to answer questions that could be poorly framed. The ‘quality assurance’ being referred to here is not just about
excellent, replicable and publishable scientiﬁc outcomes, but more importantly  following a post-normal science line of
argumentation, about research framings, agendas, questions, assumptions and outcomes that are adopted by researchers to
address societal concerns, including the very question of whether the matters of concern are scientiﬁc at all. From this
perspective, issues of framing in science deserve outmost attention here, not least because boundary institutions like the JRC
can play a role as a space where these views are aired.
Framing of issues in narrowly scientiﬁc terms can amount to what is described as “Type 3 error” – i.e. the error of
answering the wrong question – or what Lakoff (2004), Lakoff (2010) described as “hypocognition”, i.e. the use of framings to
orientate the debates as well as knowledge production within desired normative orientations, or also what Ravetz (1986)
and Rayner (2012) described as “socially constructed ignorance” – i.e. the forced simpliﬁcation of a complex issue into a
simplistic narrative.
If the narrative is misplaced and the question is wrong, the supporting evidence is irrelevant. An issue may be framed as
one of ‘risk’ of a technology when the concern of the citizens is about whose technology is adopted and why, and who
governs it. Scientiﬁc framings do not necessarily resolve socio-political controversies though they may appear desirable and
convenient to some of the interested parties. Through a number of examples from climate change, genetically modiﬁed foods
and nuclear waste disposal, Sarewitz (2004) described the exacerbation of controversy through scientised framings that
misrepresent the actual divisive issues. We note that it is a common practice to seek (through at times paternalistic
approaches) a model  be it behavioural, psychological or cultural  to explain why is it that the public dissent (Winner
1989; Wynne 1993). This can also justify overt attempts to manipulate public and media opinion to counteract dissent and
disengagement. We have witnessed several times that when strong dissent exists, but stakes are high, not all perspectives
have the same legitimate voice (e.g. on GMOs, the Internet of Things); the issues chosen to be heralded by media, companies
and sometimes governments are often impoverished accounts of the full range of perspectives available in society. For
example, proponents of GMOs observe that citizens’ hostility to GMOs is at odds with the evidence that GMOs do not have
negative health effects. According to the results of a EU-funded study (Marris, Wynne, Simmons, & Weldon, 2001), food
safety was not prominent in the list of citizens’ concerns on GMOs. A list of concerns registered by Marris and colleagues
includes, “1. Why do we need GMOs? What are the beneﬁts? 2. Who will beneﬁt from their use? 3. Who decided that they should be
developed and how? 4. Why were we not better informed about their use in our food, before their arrival on the market? 5. Why are
we not given an effective choice about whether or not to buy and consume these products? 6. Do regulatory authorities have
sufﬁcient powers and resources to effectively counter-balance large companies who wish to develop these products?”
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Sprangler et al., 2012) focuses on a trivial aspect of the organic versus conventional comparison, i.e. the poorly deﬁned
“nutritious” aspects of organic food, while that is not the primary reason why people acquire organic food.
Even issues where once upon a time a linear model of input from science to policy seemed possible have become ‘wicked’
(Rittel & Webber, 1973) implying that they are deeply entangled in a web of hardly separable facts, interests and values. This
applies to GMOs, climate, bees and pesticides, shale gas fracking, and many others.
Framing is about what is chosen to sustain an argument, including the types of knowledge produced and mobilised for
policy making or simply proﬁt; hence, we must allude here to another longstanding issue: numbers.
“the appeal of numbers is especially compelling to bureaucratic ofﬁcials who lack a mandate of popular election or divine
right; scientiﬁc objectivity thus provides an answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness; is a way of making
decisions without seeming to decide.” (Porter, 1996).
Many authors (Sarewitz, Pielke, & Byerly, 2000; Pilkey & Pilkey-Jarvis, 2007; Giampietro & Saltelli, 2016) have extensively
looked into numbers produced as indicators and/or by statistical and predictive models across different ﬁelds in the context
of ‘evidence based’ action. In Guimarães Pereira et al. (2015) the reader can ﬁnd a number of examples of what is described as
hypocognition and “socially constructed ignorance” (Giampietro in Op. cit.) as symptoms of intentional or naïf assumptions
and simpliﬁcations of complex issues, namely in the energy, food and agricultural sectors (Giampietro; Ravetz; van der Sluijs
in Op. cit.); the confounding of scales of analysis when using quantitative information (Giampietro; Kovacic in Op. cit.);
serious misconceptions about probability leading to “quantifauxcation’ (Stark in Op. cit.); the lack of social robustness of
indicators and models used to deal with complex societal issues (Denkel in Op. cit); the signiﬁcance of quantitative
information in a plurality of perspectives where different sources of credibility and legitimacy are at stake (Kovacic in Op.
cit.); assumptions in foresight models for which there can never be knowledge to support (Kay in Op. cit.); realisation that
quantitative information embeds narratives and disciplinary perspectives that represent selective representations of reality
(e.g. Saltelli in Op. Cit.).
The discipline of economics is especially prone to deliver motivations and justiﬁcations for not so happy endings for
citizens. Harvard professors Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart calculated a threshold of 90% for the ratio of public debt to
gross domestic product, above which countries’ economic growth would supposedly be impaired. A subsequent re-analysis
by researchers from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst disproved this ﬁnding by tracing it to a coding error in the
authors’ work. However, this revelation did not lead to a reconsideration of the economic policies that had already been
implemented on the basis of the original advice (Cassidy, 2013; see also Saltelli et al., 2013 and Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2014).
Another known critique is the abuse of cost beneﬁt analyses and risk assessment offered as scientiﬁc advice to govern a
myriad of matters from environmental to health, educational and ﬁnancial matters. Indeed, this is a ﬁeld on its own right, e.g.
Krimsky and Golding (1992), Perrow (1984), Funtowicz & Ravetz (1990), Jasanoff (2010), Taleb (2007), Taleb (2012), Saltelli &
Giampietro (2016) and European Commission (2007). Sufﬁce say here that there are cases where cost beneﬁt analyses are
misused, quantifying the unquantiﬁable, or where a problem of acceptability of a new technology is arbitrarily reframed as
an issue of risk (see e.g. Winner, 1989). A deeper discussion of the issues dealt with in this section can be found in Benessia
et al. (2016); a discussion of the root causes of science’s crisis and its possible solutions is in Saltelli, Ravetz, and Funtowicz
(2016).
2.2. Quality in times of distributed knowledge production
Ulrich Beck (1992) called ‘reﬂexive modernity’ a state in which growing bodies of knowledge are accessible to growing
number of individuals with added agency that enables them to intervene in the world. Several authors have anticipated this
state of deeper involvement of non-experts in scientiﬁc dimensions of societal matters. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) called
for reﬂexivity through their concepts of “extended peer communities” and “extended facts” which is at the core of post-
normal science; Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe (2001) describe it as “public dialogue and participation model”, whilst
Jasanoff (2005) explores this state of affairs through the concept of “civic epistemologies”. These concepts explicitly reject
the deﬁcit model (inspirational for the Public Understanding of Science (PUS) movement) and the thesis of the public’s
inability to act on scientiﬁc issues, supporting instead efforts for democratising science.
Indeed, in Europe, the UK BSE “scandal” of the mid-1980s to mid-1990s is often cited as pivotal in the change of direction
in the relations between science and policy making. This crisis was perhaps instrumental in calling into question the deﬁcit
model, i.e. the idea that opposition to “innovation”, in particular techno-science is due to the publics’ and policy makers’
scarce knowledge of science. Unfortunately, this model is still alive, even if increasingly challenged. During the 1990s a new
language of “science & society” towards dialogue and engagement emerged. From a historical perspective, one can say that a
key moment was the publication of the 2000 House of Lords report on Science and Society followed a year later by the
European Commission’s Science and Society Action Plan (European Commission, 2002), or the UK government sponsored
debate on genetically modiﬁed crops “The GM Nation?” often seen as an example of response in the aftermath of the BSE
crisis (Gaskell et al., 2003). It is instructive to see how the EC research programmes addressing publics’ interfaces have been
changing their name: ‘Science and Society’, ‘Science in Society’, ‘Science with Society’, and with Horizon 2020 ‘Science in and
with Society’. In the EU parlance, public engagement and ethics are at the heart of the “responsible research and innovation”
(RRI) initiative from 2013 onwards.
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were proposed, such as PNS due to Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991), Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992), Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993),
Mode 2 Science due to Gibbons et al. (1994) and others  see Carrozza (2015) for a recent discussion of these frameworks.
Quality assurance is the core argument of post-normal science and also of our suggestion for identity change of institutions
like the JRC. In a workshop on post-normal science held at the JRC in March 2016, the consideration was made that:
“The attribute Quality is, at once, pragmatic, recursive and moral. It is pragmatic in that ‘ﬁtness for function’ depends on
that function and on whose purposes are served by it; hence Quality is tightly embedded in a context of users and testers.
It is recursive, for as the Roman poet Juvenal wrote in his Satires, ‘Quis custodiet custodes ipsos?’ – who guards the
guardians? And it is moral, since no externally enforced system can sustain itself; ‘wherever there’s a system there’s
racket to beat it’. The maintenance of a system of quality assurance is thus a constant struggle against its inherent self-
corrupting tendencies.” Jerome Ravetz, @ New Currents in Science: Challenges of Quality 3–4 March 2016, JRC.
As Ravetz points out, there is no simple way to deﬁne and measure ‘Quality’: especially in the case of policy relevant
science, the criteria of quality, and the measures for quality assurance, must reﬂect the extended constituencies of those who
will be affected by the policies implemented. Hence, it is hard to think of simply measuring it; quality cannot be thought to be
the activity of a speciﬁc elite, but rather needs to be performed collectively in continuous collaborative ways.
Quality becomes ever more important in an era of Do It Yourself (DIY). The digital culture and phenomena like Citizen
Science (Irwin, 1995 and Wildschut, this issue), DIY science (Nascimento, Guimarães Pereira, & Ghezzi, 2014; Ravetz,
Guimarães Pereira, & Nascimento, 2015) and the “Open Everything” paradigm (Steele, 2014), with a broader community of
actors that produce, preserve and deploy knowledge, certainly has effects on mainstream scientiﬁc institutions’ knowledge
production, assessment, organisation and governance. Such deeper involvements of society in the scientiﬁc enterprise arise
from individuals and communities with different agency, gazes and guises, relying on voluntary and self- or community
supported initiatives. Makerspaces and hackerspaces, for example, are emblematic movements of this trend, but the recent
past has also witnessed crowd-funded radioactivity measurements in the aftermath of Fukushima (McNeil, 2014), the
Quantiﬁed Self movement that deals with health self-veillance and a general drive toward commons-based “peer production”
of knowledge (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006). The discussion above interests these arrangements and practices not least
because these movements challenge mainstream scientiﬁc epistemologies, qualities and ethos (Kønig this issue et al., this
issue) and the use of scientiﬁc ‘facts’ for policy making.
One could thus argue that the current digital culture is de facto implementing the concept of “extended peer review” and
extended quality assurance described in PNS, by engaging different types of knowledge and involving an extended
community of social actors. This extension of participation calls for a reﬂection about the nature of the knowledge produced,
and on the criteria and processes for assuring quality and integrity.
3. Post-normal science as reﬂexivity practice: a new identity for boundary institutions?
3.1. Why we need a new identity
As described in the last section, science experiences a crisis of quality, trust and legitimacy affecting both its practice and
its ethos. The expectation that science sets the “facts” that underpin policy making is well encroached in the political
discourse. Likewise it is assumed that political decisions can be settled by science under the “evidence based” ﬂag in
European policy discourses, see Braun and Kroop, 2014. The former Chief Science Adviser of the EC made a quest for a
centralised “evidence service”, suggesting then that “the incoming Commission must ﬁnd better ways of separating evidence-
gathering processes from the ‘political imperative”' (see Wilsdon, 2014). This episode is worth mentioning because this
suggestion resonates well with the Demarcation Model discussed by Funtowicz (2006); this aspiration is problematic
because on the one hand it rejects the idea that co-production of scientiﬁc and social order (Jasanoff 1996; Shapin & Schaffer,
2011); on the other hand, it does not recognise that evidence gathering is also a matter of choice of the questions to be asked
and researched; of the framings in which questions are tackled; of the governance of uncertainty and the unknowns; of the
choice of the spoke persons and communication strategies. The idea that science is apolitical or value-free is being
repeatedly contrasted (see Saltelli & Giampietro, 2017). As discussed earlier, the framing of the question to be addressed, as
well as the method chosen to tackle it, depend on the actors involved. In some cases the danger is that of evidence-based
policy being turned into policy-based evidence, not necessarily because of speciﬁc pressures but simply because of the frantic
pace of the policy processes, whereby by the time the bell for evidence rings in the ofﬁce of the tasked ofﬁcer the policy
options have already been taken. It is in these settings that quality assurance must rely both on higher standards of
institutional peer review process as well as on engagement with relevant societal actors. Hence, the epistemological and
practical problems need to be solved jointly, based on the recognition that they are co-produced.
Instrumental or disingenuous goals dominate thinking about evidence-based policy (see e.g. Boswell, 2009 and Saltelli &
Giampietro, 2016; for a review). Yet, as Boswell (2009) argues often the impact of scientiﬁc advice on policy making is rather
symbolic, serving both as credibility device and as opportune grounding for policy makers’ objectives. These aims are
certainly important, but here we would like to offer scientiﬁc advice as an opportunity of societal reﬂexivity. Reﬂexive
practice in institutions like the EC is not only about the chosen body of knowledge to sustain particular claims, the
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existing narratives against a broader spectrum of worldviews.
It is in this context that we argue that the foundations of post-normal science are most relevant if we are serious about
taking the challenges of our times in institutions like the JRC. Time and spaces need to be actively created where all bodies of
knowledge are mobilised into discussions before the relevant knowledge  either requested from or offered to policy circles-
is produced and circulated. But what changes are needed in institutions like this to accommodate such needed spaces and
time?
Elsewhere (Guimarães Pereira & Saltelli, 2014) we have examined science advice models and their potential relevance for
a boundary institution such as the JRC. In this paper we will not engage in this discussion but we argue that scientiﬁc advice
to policy deals with similar types of tensions that impinge the governance and practice of science that we described earlier.
Therefore, we note that the practices and commitments to knowledge quality assurance that are performed in boundary
institutions cannot be extrinsic to the practices and commitments of the institutions where that knowledge is used.
3.2. PNS practices and commitments
Boundary institutions like the JRC could explore a different understanding of knowledge production and ﬂowing in order
to respond to the on-going crises. We suggest that the JRC, in particular, is in a unique position to create a new identity
organised around reﬂexivity and quality assurance practices. Two unique features facilitate this endeavour: it being part of
the policy cycle, on the one hand, and its natural closeness to scientiﬁc production on the other.
Such a new identity would emphasise a commitment to three intertwined and complementary cultures, which embrace
the post-normal science framework: that of quality assurance by an extended peer community: that of reﬂexivity and critical
thinking; and ﬁnally that of an ethos of care.
3.2.1. Quality assurance by an extended peer community
As discussed earlier, there is no simple way to deﬁne and measure ‘Quality’. Several decades of STS and PNS research have
highlighted that the kind of quality assurance we suggest here can only be done by integrating an extended peer community,
which in turn requires extended peer review practices that acknowledge emerging epistemologies, putting critical thinking at
the heart of the institution’s operation. The aim is to deliver not only scientiﬁcally valid, but also socially and ethically robust
scientiﬁc advice to policy making, grounded on PNS and science and technology studies, acknowledging that a broad
spectrum of norms needs to be consulted. The tools to assure quality of policy relevant science may come from within science
itself as there are branches of science that have been engaging in these sorts of scrutiny for decades, but also from the
humanities and the arts, as well as from the continued engagement of the relevant extended peer communities. These
different forms of engagement value dialogic governance. They acknowledge that when facing different uncertainties and
unknowns, the anticipation of impacts, the decision about which facts and norms are relevant, the questions to be asked and
the methods of enquiry are all collective tasks, not to be surrendered to powerful elites, not even to an elite of scientists.
3.2.2. Reﬂexivity and critical thinking
Our proposal includes securing time and space for researchers to act sceptically and inquisitively about policy agendas
and political imaginaries which use scientiﬁc information as a relevant body of knowledge, in other words the “evidence” in
the “policy based evidence”. Such space is about nurturing an in-house culture of critical and reﬂexive thinking about
techno-scientiﬁc issues and their societal implications. This is achieved by conducting collaborative case studies, exploring
synergies across teams co-working on ﬁles in need of this type of approaches. This reﬂexivity model of scientiﬁc production
and circulation aims at challenging long standing narratives and at testing their relevance against societal agendas and
societal values. At the JRC, our example here, there has been some signals of change, it being in the form of workshops that
openly challenge current narratives (Guimarães Pereira, Ravetz, & Saltelli, 2015), look into how current problems of the
scientiﬁc endeavour are challenging our received meanings of quality (Ravetz, Guimarães Pereira, & Nascimento, 2015;
Saltelli et al., 2016; Guimarães Pereira & Ravetz 2016); a strategy and reorganisation that fosters multi-disciplinary
collaborations; projects that bring humanities and arts as genuine bodies of knowledge into policy discussions, as well as
signs of commitment to societal engagements that foster quality assurance as described in PNS.
3.2.3. Ethos of care
De la Bellacasa (2011) argued for an ethos of care in the study of science and technology, introducing the notion of
‘matters of care’ as a way to generate ‘caring relationships’ which allow investigation of not only what ethos is behind
techno-scientiﬁc innovations but also asking ‘how to care’. The work of De La Bellacasa is relevant for our argument, as we
need to ask the same questions when we frame a policy issue, choose the relevant bodies of knowledge to address it, and
implement and monitor action.
For the JRC, this move is plausible, as it has been one of the loci of the PNS scholarship and practice, see e.g. Funtowicz and
Ravetz (1990), Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991), Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992), Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993), Guimarães Pereira
& O’Connor (1999), Gough et al. (2003), Guimarães Pereira & Funtowicz (2013).
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In our previous brief (Guimarães Pereira & Saltelli, 2014) we suggested that the main challenge faced by an organisation
such as the JRC in this process is that important actors of change  the scientists themselves and their institutional
counterparts, are at the same time engaged and committed with those existing styles and methods which would be most in
need of change. The elements that we presented here calls for changing ways of working and for a broader realisation that we
have reached a point of non-return. Hence we suggest that ‘boundary organisations’, such as the JRC taken here as an
example  should appeal to three cultures, i.e. (i) of quality assurance involving the relevant extended peer community, (ii) of
reﬂexivity and critical thinking and (iii) of ethos of care. There is no easy way out to counteract what is described as
democratic deﬁcit affecting institutions like the EC; however, we argue here that by choosing to work within existing
constraints while embracing reﬂexive and dialogic notions and practices is a ﬁrst step for an identity responsive to
contemporary challenges. These notions and practices are at the heart of the post-normal science framework, requesting
consideration for the emerging ways in which science is being produced, quality assured and circulated in institutions that
support or advise policy making. This means, in practice, a serious commitment to engage different ways of knowing to deal
with societal challenges while fostering an identity close to narratives of care about humans and non-humans. We contend
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